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Abstract1 2—The President’s Vision for Space Exploration 
presents a need to determine the best architecture and set of 
vehicle elements in order to achieve a sustained human 
lunar exploration program. The Lunar Architecture 
Stochastic Simulator and Optimizer (LASSO), a new 
simulation-based capability based on discrete-event 
simulation, was created to address this question by 
probabilistically simulating lunar transportation architecture 
based on cost, reliability, and throughput figures of merit. In 
this study, two competing lunar transportation architectures 
are examined for a variety of launch vehicle scenarios to 
determine the best approach for human lunar exploration. 
Additionally, the two architectures are also compared for 
varying available ground infrastructure and desired flight 
rates. It is concluded that an expendable architecture is 
favored, using man-rated versions of existing evolved 
expendable launch vehicles (EELVs) for crew launches and 
developing a heavy-lift launch vehicle for cargo launches. 
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In the President’s Vision for Space Exploration, President 
Bush called for a return to the Moon no later than the year 
2020 [1]. In order to do so, however, it is necessary to 
determine the best architecture and suite of vehicles within 
that architecture in order to accomplish the President’s 
Vision. Historically, many of these decisions have been 
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made based on deterministic mass and performance-based 
analyses. Metrics such as cost, reliability, and the ability to 
meet a given campaign schedule have been considered later 
in the design process after many architecture and vehicle 
decisions have already been made, generally increasing the 
overall cost of the mission. Therefore, the ability to rapidly 
measure cost, reliability, and schedule impacts of top-level 
architecture and individual element decisions represents a 
significant improvement over the current deterministic 
analysis capabilities for top-level decision making. 
Allowing this knowledge to be brought forward in the 
design process will help to reduce the overall program costs 
down the road.  
This capability is provided by LASSO, the Lunar 
Architecture Stochastic Simulator and Optimizer, which 
was developed in order to conduct this study. LASSO is a 
simulation-based capability, based upon discrete-event 
simulation (DES), that provides the ability to 
probabilistically simulate and optimize an overall lunar 
transportation approach. Discrete-event simulation is a 
fairly new tool to the space industry. Some work has begun, 
however, in using DES to model aspects of space missions, 
although it has generally been limited to modeling only 
ground operations. For example, NASA Kennedy Space 
Center has developed GEM-FLO (A Generic Simulation 
Environment for Modeling Future Launch Operations) 
using discrete-event simulation to model the launch 
operations processing for space transportation systems [2]. 
RLVSim (Reusable Launch Vehicle Simulation) was 
created at Georgia Tech, and is also a discrete-event 
simulation model for reusable launch vehicle ground 
operations [3]. 
Using LASSO, two competing architectures for lunar 
exploration are examined – an expendable, Apollo-style 
architecture and a highly-reusable next generation 
architecture. The main trade study examines the merits of 
each architecture, based on cost, reliability, and mission 
throughput, for a set of launch vehicle options. The two 
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architectures are also compared against each other as a 
function of varying flight rates. Based on the architectures 
considered in this study, some conclusions are drawn as to 
the better architecture choice for the planned lunar 
transportation missions. 
This paper begins with a brief overview of the tool and 
methodology used to conduct the lunar architecture trade 
study.  It is followed by a description of each architecture 
and the key assumptions made.  Finally, the results of the 
architecture study are presented along with conclusions as 
to the preferred architecture choice for lunar exploration. 
2. MODELING APPROACH AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Modeling Approach 
The two architectures under consideration were simulated 
using LASSO, which integrates three existing software 
programs to model, analyze and optimize lunar exploration 
architectures: Rockwell Software’s Arena, Microsoft Excel, 
and Phoenix Integration’s ModelCenter®. A database of 
flight elements for each architecture is available in Excel, 
and includes launch vehicles, in-space propulsive stages, 
lunar landers, and crew exploration vehicles (CEVs). For 
each element, Excel contains pertinent metrics such as gross 
mass, propellant mass, payload capacity, cost, reliability, 
and cycle times. The elements contained in the database are 
a combination of existing flight elements and conceptual 
designs. 
Arena, a discrete-event simulation package, is then used to 
create full end-to-end models of each architecture, including 
manufacturing of all the necessary transportation elements, 
payload and launch vehicle integration, launch, in-space 
propulsive segments, Earth re-entry, and turn-around 
processes for any reusable elements. Finally, the Arena 
models, along with the Excel database, are integrated into 
ModelCenter, to allow for design space exploration and 
optimization, as well as to facilitate parametric studies, as 
will be presented in this study. 
For more information on LASSO, consult references [4] and 
[5]. 
Lunar Architecture Concepts 
Each architecture modeled in this study has some common 
mission assumptions, as outlined below: 
• Orbit characteristics: 
o LEO rendezvous orbit = 400 km × 28.5° 
o LLO rendezvous orbit = 100 km × 90°  
• Trajectory: 
o Time of Flight (LEO to LLO) = 3.5 days 
o TLI Delta-V = 3100 m/s 
o LOI/TEI Delta-V = 840 m/s 
• Lunar mission specifications: 
o Number of crew = 4 
o Time on lunar surface = 4 days 
o Payload to lunar surface = 500 kg 
o Payload from lunar surface = 100 kg 
The expendable architecture, shown in Figure 1, consists of 
all expendable elements, as its name suggests. All the cargo 
elements are first launched into low Earth orbit on one or 
more cargo launch vehicles, depending on the payload 
capacity of the launch vehicle chosen. The crew is then 
launched in the CEV, along with the TEI stage, on a man-
 
Figure 1 – Expendable Lunar Architecture 
 
Figure 2 – Reusable Lunar Architecture 
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rated launch vehicle. All of these elements dock in Earth 
orbit, before beginning their transit to the Moon.  Once in 
lunar orbit, the lunar lander ferries the crew to the lunar 
surface, while the CEV and TEI remain in lunar orbit. The 
chosen lander has a built-in habitat in the ascent stage, but if 
another surface habitat is desired, it would have to be pre-
deployed. The lander descent stage remains on the lunar 
surface, while the ascent stage then launches the crew back 
to lunar orbit, where it docks with the CEV and TEI. The 
crew transfers to the CEV, which travels back to Earth for a 
direct entry to the surface. 
The major difference in the reusable architecture, shown in 
Figure, is the use of a reusable lunar lander and propellant 
depot in lunar orbit. Again, the cargo launches first on one 
or more launch vehicles, followed by the crew in the CEV, 
along with the TEI stage. The propellant depot and lander 
are pre-deployed along with a surface habitat if desired. At 
the beginning of the simulation, an empty depot is assumed 
to already be located lunar orbit, and the lander is launched 
fully fueled before the first human lunar mission. Once the 
CEV/TEI and TLI have launched, they dock in Earth orbit 
and travel to the moon as a single stack. Upon arriving in 
lunar orbit, the lander ferries the CEV to the surface (the 
reusable lander does not have a built-in habitat), while the 
TEI remains in lunar orbit. Upon completion of the lunar 
mission, the lander launches the CEV back to lunar orbit, 
where it docks with the TEI for Earth-return. The lander 
refuels from the propellant depot and remains in lunar orbit 
until the next lunar mission is launched. The lander must be 
periodically replaced when it lifetime expires. Additionally, 
dedicated propellant launches to lunar orbit are required to 
periodically refill the depot with propellant. 
Modeling Assumptions 
Several key assumptions were made in the modeling of 
these architectures. Most importantly, the LASSO 
architecture models model only the transportation-related 
elements along with their associated costs. This includes 
associated processes such as manufacturing, integration 
with the launch vehicle, and in-space segments, as well as 
costs such as DDTE, production, and operations. The 
transportation aspect of the lunar exploration program, 
however, comprises only a portion of the overall life-cycle 
cost of an actual program.  In addition to the transportation 
elements, there are also costs associated with science 
payloads, technology development, precursor missions, etc.  
Additionally, the user can input the number of ground 
facilities available, such as vehicle manufacturing facilities, 
integration facilities, and launch pads. The cost of building 
these facilities, however, is also beyond the scope of the 
Arena models. Therefore, the total cost reported by Arena 
can not be taken as the actual total cost of a lunar program. 
Additional assumptions are made about the choice of launch 
vehicles. For a given architecture simulation, the user has a 
choice of three different launch vehicles: one each for crew, 
cargo, and propellant. The propellant launch vehicle is used 
in the reusable architecture to launch propellant to the lunar 
Table 1. Inputs to Arena Lunar Architecture Models 
Input Baseline Description 
Missions per Year 2 Number of scheduled lunar missions per year (can be a fractional 
value). 
Program Duration 10 Number of years in lunar program (starting with first mission launch). 
Vehicle Indices  Index number corresponding to an entry in the database for each 
element type (CEV, TLI, Lander, TEI, LV crew, LV cargo, and LV 
propellant). 
Integration Time 28 days Expected time for payload integration with launch vehicle. 
Pad Time 14 days Expected time for payload/launch vehicle stack to spend on launch pad 
prior to launch. 
Pad TAT 14 days Expected turn-around time of launch pad. 
Investigation Time 365 days Expected length of stand down time resulting from loss of crew event. 
Manufacturing 
Capacities 
 Number of a particular element that can be built at one time (one 
variable each for CEV, TLI, TEI, and lander). 
Integration 
Capacities 
 Number of launch vehicles that can be integrated with their payloads at 
a given time (one variable each for crew, cargo, and propellant). 
Launch Pads  Number of launch pads available to that particular launch vehicle (one 
each for crew, cargo, and propellant). 
Depot Capacity 50,000 kg Propellant capacity of propellant depot (if applicable). 
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propellant depot. Additionally, if a propulsive stage is too 
heavy to launch fully fueled, it is assumed that it can be 
launched empty or partially fueled, and a dedicated 
propellant launch will be responsible for on-orbit propellant 
transfer to that stage. Therefore it is assumed that the 
technology for on-orbit propellant transfer exists at the time 
of the lunar missions. Each type of launch vehicle has a set 
of dedicated facilities (payload integration and launch pads). 
The launches always occur in the following order: cargo, 
propellant (if necessary), and crew. The crew do not launch 
until all other elements have successfully reached Earth 
orbit. If a cargo or crew launch is unsuccessful, that 
particular mission is cancelled. If a propellant launch, fails, 
however, another is launched to replace it. 
Finally, each event during the lunar mission has some 
probability of failure associated with it. When there is no 
abort option, or the abort is unsuccessful, a loss of crew 
event occurs. A stand down time then results, and all 
missions scheduled to launch during that time period are 
cancelled. 
Inputs and Outputs 
The important inputs to the simulation are presented in 
Table 1, along with the baseline values used for this study. 
In addition to those listed below, each of the vehicles 
chosen has its own relevant variables, such as weight, cost, 
and turn-around time (for reusable elements). Each of the 
cost and time variables has a triangular distribution assigned 
to it within Arena, in order to account for the uncertainly in 
the given value. 
Because the inputs to the simulation are probabilistic, the 
Arena models must be repeated numerous times in order to 
generate output distributions on the figures of merit. Arena 
samples values from the input distributions, similar to a 
Monte Carlo simulation, and outputs cumulative distribution 
functions (CDFs) for each output variable. The number of 
replications was limited to one hundred for each case due to 
the long run times required in Arena. For the results 
presented in this study, 90% confidence values were used. 
The key figures of merit are listed below, and they 
encompass the three primary areas of interest: cost, 
reliability, and mission throughput: 
• Life cycle cost – Total transportation-related 
program cost (includes DDTE, production, fixed 
and variable operations, launch, and propellant). 
• Cost per mission – Life cycle cost divided by the 
number of missions launched. 
• Loss of crew – Probability per mission that a loss 
of crew event occurs (number of loss of crew 
events divided by number of launched missions). 
• Loss of mission – Probability per mission that a 
loss of mission event occurs (includes loss of crew 
events). 
• Mission capture % - Percent of scheduled missions 
that are launched during the program duration. 
• Launch delay time – Average time between 
scheduled launch date and actual launch date of a 
particular mission. 
• Time in LEO – Average time between first and last 
launch for a particular mission. Used to determine 
the longest amount of time a particular element 
must spend in LEO. 
• Bottleneck statistics – Average waiting time in 
queues (manufacturing, integration, launch pads, 
turn-around processes). Used to determine the 
limiting ground infrastructure. 
These figures of merit comprise an overall evaluation 
criterion (OEC) which is used to evaluate the overall merit 
of each architecture being examined.   
Launch Vehicle Trade Study Scenarios 
In the first part of the study, four different launch scenarios 
(each with several subcategories) are examined for each 
architecture, in addition to a baseline case. These were 
chosen to be representative of the launch options that had 
been under consideration for human lunar exploration. All 
of these launch scenarios assume that any dedicated 
propellant launches are carried out using the same launch 
vehicle as the cargo launches. Table 2 summarizes the 
various launch options examined in this study.  
In addition to the launch vehicle combinations, several 
ground infrastructure scenarios are examined for each case, 
as listed below: 
• Infrastructure Scenario #1: Unlimited ground 
infrastructure. 
• Infrastructure Scenario #2: Limited launch 
infrastructure; unlimited manufacturing capacity. 
• Infrastructure Scenario #3: Limited launch 
infrastructure and manufacturing capacity. 
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First, unlimited ground infrastructure will be considered 
such that the mission capture rate will be 100%, and the 
launch delay time and the time of elements in LEO will be 
essentially zero (assuming that launches occur at the same 
time). Unlimited ground infrastructure will enable 
comparison between the various launch scenarios based 
solely on cost and reliability. Next, a limited set of launch 
infrastructure will be used, with unlimited manufacturing 
capacities. This scenario assumes that the companies 
responsible for manufacturing each element will be able to 
upgrade their facilities as necessitated by the demand. Using 
this scenario, the various launch scenarios can be compared 
based on scheduling metrics: mission capture percentage, 
launch delay time, and time in LEO. Finally, the last 
scenario will examine both limited launch and 
manufacturing capacities, also to compare launch options 
based on the scheduling metrics. From this scenario, the 
limiting capacity in the system can be determined by 
examining the bottleneck statistics.   
3. LUNAR ARCHITECTURE STUDY RESULTS 
For this study, a baseline set of vehicle elements is used, 
with only the choice of launch vehicles being varied, as 
listed in Table 2.  
Expendable Architecture—First, the expendable 
architecture is examined. Figure 3 (see Appendix for all 
subsequent figures) plots the life-cycle cost for each launch 
scenario based on the unlimited ground infrastructure 
scenario. As can be seen, life-cycle cost ranges from 
approximately $53 to $72 billion for 20 lunar missions in a 
ten-year period, with cost per mission ranging from $2.9 to 
$3.9 billion. The results represent a trade-off between 
increased DDTE and launch costs for heavy-lift launch 
vehicles, but with fewer flights required per lunar mission. 
If a launch vehicle configuration were to be chosen based 
only on cost, clearly the baseline option would be chosen.  
Reliability is then examined for each launch scenario. 
Figure 4 plots the loss of crew (LOC) and loss of mission 
(LOM) probabilities for each case. The baseline case falls 
somewhere in the middle of the launch options being traded. 
The variations in LOC and LOM are due entirely to the 
choice of launch vehicles, with LOC variation due mainly to 
the reliability of the crew launch vehicle. The loss of 
mission numbers can be attributed to a combination of the 
reliability of the cargo launch vehicle and the number of 
cargo launches. Since a mission is cancelled if a cargo 
launch fails, more cargo launches results in a higher LOM if 
the reliabilities are similar. The HLV options seem to have 
the best overall reliability if both loss of crew and loss of 
mission are considered. 
Next, infrastructure scenario #2 was considered, where 
there is only one available integration facility and launch 
pad for each type of launch vehicle (crew, cargo, 
propellant). It is expected that the launch configurations that 
require more launches should have a lower mission capture 
percentage, a longer launch delay, and a longer time in 
LEO. Even using the limiting case (capacity of one for all 
infrastructure and launch pads), the mission capture rate is 
100% for all cases except for 1a(A) and 1b(A). Even for 
these two launch options, the capture rate is still 98%. 
Therefore, at a launch rate of two missions per year, the 
launch infrastructure is not a limiting factor in meeting the 
mission demand. The launch delay is also essentially zero 
for all cases, since on average the first launch per mission 
launches on time. 
The key statistic for this infrastructure scenario is the 
average time in LEO – that is, the average time between the 
first and last launch per mission.  As this time increases, the 
mission becomes more infeasible, since elements have to 
remain in orbit for long periods of time before departing for 
the Moon. For example, engines must be able to start after a 
long time in orbit and propellant boil-off must be 
considered. The more launches that are required, the longer 
the time in orbit should be. This is confirmed by Figure 5, 
which plots the average time in Earth orbit for each launch 
option. For the Existing EELV options, the time in LEO 
ranges from three months to just over five months, which 
begins to become prohibitively long for elements to remain 
in orbit. Additionally, this launch option would not be able 
to achieve a greater mission demand, since it already takes 
almost half a year to launch one mission. If more than two 
missions a year were desired, the mission capture rate 
would fall below 100%. For the Evolved EELV and 
Shuttle-derived options, the time in orbit is around one 
Table 2. Performance of launch vehicles examined for 







 Baseline 23 mt 100 mt 
1a(A) Existing EELVs 10 mt 19 mt 
1a(D) Existing EELVs 9 mt 23 mt 
1b(A) Existing EELVs 19 mt 19 mt 
1b(D) Existing EELVs 23 mt 23 mt 
2a(A) Evolved EELVs 19 mt 40 mt 
2a(D) Evolved EELVs 23 mt 40 mt 
2b(A) Evolved EELVs 19 mt 70 mt 
2b(D) Evolved EELVs 23 mt 40 mt 
3a HLVs 35 mt 100 mt 
3b HLVs 35 mt 140 mt 
4a Shuttle-Derived 20 mt 77 mt 
4b Shuttle-Derived 34 mt 77 mt 
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month, and there is almost no time in orbit for the baseline 
and HLV options.  
Finally, infrastructure scenario #3 was taken into account, 
where in addition to the limited launch infrastructure, only 
one of each element type can be manufactured at a time. 
While the minimum launch infrastructure did not provide a 
limiting case to mission throughput, the minimum 
manufacturing capacities do reduce the mission capture 
percentage below 100%. With the exception of the launch 
vehicles, the same elements were used for each case. 
Therefore, the results of limiting the ground infrastructure 
did not vary across the different launch scenarios. Table 3 
lists the average wait time in the queue for each 
manufacturing process. This represents the time between 
when an order is placed for an element and when it actually 
begins manufacturing.  
Clearly, the CEV and Lander manufacturing are causing the 
biggest bottleneck in the system, with the TEI 
manufacturing causing the next biggest bottleneck.  The 
manufacturing capacity seems to be sufficient, however, for 
the TLI. Because the manufacturing capacities affect each 
launch option equally for the baseline mission scenario, 
there is no launch option that would be favorable based on 
the least investment required in ground facilities. For the 
expendable architecture, however, the minimum required 
ground infrastructure to achieve 100% mission capture is as 
follows: 
• Launch pads – 1 each 
• Launch vehicle integration facilities – 1 each 
• Manufacturing – 2 each for CEV, Lander, TEI; 1 
for TLI 
The only small exception were the two launch options 
(1a(A) and 1b(A)) that did not quite meet 100% mission 
capture with the limited launch infrastructure. 
Finally, it is useful to examine a combined cost-reliability-
throughput overall evaluation criterion (OEC) to examine 
the trade between the various figures of merit.  This OEC is 
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Cost, reliability, and time in LEO each have a weighting of 
1/3. Each metric is normalized such that each falls in the 
range zero to one. Figure 6 plots the new OEC for each 
launch configuration. Because the baseline launch case did 
well in all three categories, it was the best overall launch 
option, with the heavy lift launch vehicles finishing a close 
second. 
Expendable Architecture Summary—In general, when 
looking at cost, reliability, and throughput, the results for 
the launch vehicle trade tend to favor launch options that 
require fewer launches per mission. Cost depends on a trade 
between number of launches and cost per launch. Fewer 
launches do not necessarily translate to a lower life-cycle 
cost. When looking solely at cost, both the Existing EELVs 
(which require up to eight launches per mission) did as well 
as the HLVs (which required only two launches per 
mission). Reliability (particularly LOM), however, is 
strongly affected by the number of launches required, since 
there is not a large variation in the reliability of the actual 
launch vehicles being examined. Furthermore, as the launch 
infrastructure is limited, fewer required launches also 
translates into less time in LEO, which makes an 
architecture more feasible based on today’s technology.  
Additionally, for any of the launch options examined, no 
significant infrastructure investment needs to be made.  One 
launch pad and an integration facility with a capacity of one 
for each type of launch vehicle are sufficient to launch all 
missions on time. Of course, to reduce the time in LEO for 
some of the launch options, more launch pads and 
integration facilities would have to be built, making those 
launch options more unattractive. Manufacturing capacities 
of two are also sufficient to meet the mission demands, 
which is a reasonable value to expect. 
For all of the scenarios and launch options examined for the 
expendable Lunar Architecture, the baseline launch 
configuration remains the best option, in terms of a 
combination of cost, reliability, and scheduling. Next best 
are the two HLV launch options, which actually have the 
best reliability of all the launch options. If reliability were 
the primary concern, with less weighting on cost, the HLV 
options would be chosen. The baseline configuration does 
well overall though, because it uses an HLV as its cargo 
launch vehicle, while using smaller man-rated launch 
vehicle to launch the crew. Therefore, based on the overall 
consideration of cost, reliability, and scheduling, the 
baseline configuration is chosen as the best launch option 
for the expendable lunar architecture. 
Table 3. Manufacturing Queue Wait Times for 
Launch Vehicle Trade Study (Expendable 
Architecture) 






Reusable Architecture—The same launch vehicle options 
were considered for the reusable architecture, again looking 
at the three different infrastructure scenarios. Figure 7 plots 
the life-cycle cost for this architecture, based on the 
unlimited ground infrastructure scenario. Immediately 
apparent is the increased cost over the expendable 
architecture. The life-cycle costs range from $91B to 
$137B, with the cost per mission ranging from $4.9B to 
$7.4B. Although for some launch cases, there are fewer 
launches required per lunar mission, the added cost of 
launching propellant to lunar orbit significantly increases 
the life-cycle cost over the expendable architecture. For the 
reusable architecture, the baseline launch vehicle 
combination actually does not come out the least expensive. 
Both Shuttle-derived options and the HLV option with the 
140 mt cargo launch vehicle are the least expensive. 
Overall, these options require the fewest launches, both for 
the lunar missions and the depot refueling missions. 
Figure 8 plots the reliability for all of the launch options. As 
expected, the launch options with the least number of cargo 
launches per lunar mission have the lowest loss of mission 
probability. The propellant and depot launches will not 
affect reliability, since those missions are simply re-
launched if there is a failure. Loss of crew is again a 
function of the reliability of the crew launch vehicle.  The 
highest values of LOC occur for options #1a, where a crew 
escape system does not fit in the launch vehicle. 
Limiting the launch infrastructure should have a significant 
effect on the reusable architecture, because of the additional 
launches required for refilling the propellant depot. When 
all of the integration capacities and number of launch pads 
are set to 1, the mission capture percentage for all of the 
Existing EELV launch options drops significantly below 
100%, to approximately 60%. This is due to their smaller 
payload capacities coupled with the increased launch 
demand to resupply the propellant depot. As the capture rate 
decreases, the launch delay time also increases. For the 
Existing EELVs, the launch delay ranges from 662 days to 
789 days. The longest average time in LEO is also the 
highest for the Existing EELVs, as expected, since it 
requires the most cargo and propellant launches for each 
lunar mission. Figure 9 plots the average time in LEO for 
each of the launch options. 
As with the expendable architecture, an OEC is created to 
consider cost, risk, and scheduling metrics. Both LEO Time 
and Mission Capture % are included since each addresses a 
different issue. Capture percentage relates to the ability to 
actually meet the mission demand, while time in LEO 
relates to the feasibility of the architecture. As was seen 
with the expendable architecture, an architecture with a 
mission capture rate of 100% can still have a significant 
time in LEO penalty.  The new OEC can therefore be 





















































Mission capture rate is written as (1-Capture%), since OEC 
is a quantity to be minimized and capture percentage should 
be maximized. Figure 10 plots this new OEC for each of the 
launch options. As expected, the HLVs, Shuttle-derived, 
and baseline launch options come out best, since they did 
well across all the figures of merit. 
Finally, the launch options are examined with the minimum 
possible launch infrastructure and manufacturing capacities. 
As in the expendable architecture trade study, 
manufacturing queue wait times are used as the bottleneck 
statistics for the each of the architecture elements. Table 4 
lists the bottleneck statistics described above, as an average 
across all launch options, since each launch option uses 
approximately the same number of elements for the lunar 
missions. If the standard deviations are examined, this 
variance is not significant. The CEV and TEI wait times are 
approximately equal to those for the expendable 
architecture, as expected, since the lunar mission schedule is 
the same. Whereas TLI manufacturing did not cause a 
bottleneck in the expendable architecture, it does in the 
reusable architecture because more TLI stages are required 
for the depot launches.  
 
Also unlike the expendable architecture, limiting the ground 
infrastructure has a significant effect on the mission capture 
percentage for the reusable architecture. The Existing EELV 
options are lower than the others since they are also affected 
by the limited launch infrastructure. The average capture 
percentage of the remaining launch options is 
approximately 37%. Additionally, the time in LEO and the 
launch delay time both follow the same trend observed in 
the limited launch infrastructure case, just with higher 
values of launch delay time. The reusable architecture will 
therefore require a more significant infrastructure 
Table 4. Manufacturing Queue Wait Times for 
Launch Vehicle Trade Study (Reusable Architecture) 






investment to reach 100% mission capture and reduce the 
time elements spend in LEO. 
Reusable Architecture Summary— As with the expendable 
architecture, the best launch option for the reusable lunar 
architecture when considering cost, reliability, and 
throughput is heavily dependent on the number of launches. 
This architecture is particularly sensitive to the payload 
capacity of the launch vehicles, since extra launches are 
required to continuously refuel the LLO propellant depot. 
Fewer overall launches tend towards a lower cost solution, 
while fewer cargo launches per lunar mission tend towards 
a lower loss of mission probability. Additionally, as the 
launch infrastructure and manufacturing capacities are 
limited, the launch options requiring more launches take a 
particularly big hit in terms of mission capture percentage 
and launch delay time. 
The architecture investment required for the reusable 
architecture (with the exception of the Existing EELV 
options) is slightly more than for the expendable 
architecture, although it is still not enough to make the 
architecture infeasible. All of the manufacturing capacities 
are three or less, and the launch infrastructure is at a 
minimum. The Existing EELVs would require a more 
significant investment, particularly to the launch 
infrastructure. Most likely, however, these launch options 
would not be chosen because they also performed so poorly 
in cost and reliability. 
Of the launch options examined, the ones that performed the 
best were the baseline, the HLVs and the Shuttle-derived 
vehicles. Because the Shuttle-derived vehicles did so poorly 
in reliability, however, neither of these will be chosen as the 
preferred launch option. The best overall of the remaining 
choice in terms of cost, reliability, and scheduling is the 
second HLV option, using the 140 mt cargo launcher. This 
launch configuration does so well because it only requires 
one cargo launch per lunar mission and one launch per 
depot refueling mission. Looking at the launch vehicles, 
available, however, another option was considered. While 
the cargo heavy lift launch vehicle is a good choice for the 
cargo and propellant launches, the man-rated version is 
over-designed for the crew launches. Only 22 mt must be 
launched and its payload is 35 mt. An Existing EELV is 
sufficient to launch the CEV with a crew escape system and 
the TEI at a lower per launch cost. This “baseline 
improved” option was then run through LASSO and 
determined to have a lower OEC than any of the previous 
launch options considered. 
Reusable Launch Vehicle Trade Study 
The launch vehicle trade study assumed that the same 
launch vehicle was used for both cargo and dedicated 
propellant launches. Another case to be examined is using a 
reusable launch vehicle for the dedicated propellant 
launches, for the scenarios where the propulsive stages had 
to be launched empty of propellant. The advantage of a 
reusable launch vehicle is its fast turn-around time and its 
cheaper launch costs. A conceptual design for a horizontal 
take-off, horizontal landing reusable launch vehicle is 
assumed. Furthermore, it is taken to be a commercial 
venture, such that there is no DDTE cost incurred. NASA 
would simply pay for each launch as needed. Figure 11 
plots the life-cycle cost when the reusable launch vehicle is 
used for the dedicated propellant launches. For each case, 
using a reusable launch vehicle significantly increases the 
life-cycle cost, except for the scenarios where no propellant 
launches are required. Although the price per launch is 
significantly less, the payload is also less, requiring more 
propellant launches per mission. The fast turn-around time 
of a reusable launch vehicle is also not a factor in this case, 
since unlimited ground infrastructure is assumed for all 
cases. 
Clearly, it does not make sense economically to use this 
reusable launch vehicle to deliver propellant to Earth orbit, 
at least when turn-around time is not an issue. If the same 
launch vehicle were to be offered at a discounted price, then 
it may become competitive with the expendable launch 
vehicles. Based on this analysis, the launch price of a 
reusable launch vehicle would have to be less than 
approximately $100M per flight to become competitive 
against the expendable launch vehicles, and would have to 
be reduced even further to become beneficial across the 
board. 
Annual Funding Considerations 
In the previous launch vehicle trade studies, cost was 
evaluated based on undiscounted life-cycle cost and cost per 
mission. Another important factor, however, is the 
maximum peak annual funding required. Generally a 
program is allocated a given budget on a yearly basis, not a 
lump sum that can be spent each year as needed. Therefore, 
while a chosen architecture may fit within a ten or twenty 
year budget, each year’s spending must also fit within that 
given year’s budget. The two architectures will be thus 
compared across all of the launch options in terms of yearly 
spending. It is assumed that DDTE costs are spread evenly 
across the first five years of the program. Production will 
then start the following year, with costs assigned to the year 
in which production of a particular element starts. Over the 
ten years where missions are flown, costs are broken down 
into production, launch, and operations costs. Finally, there 
are no launches in the last year of the program, but fixed 
operations costs are still incurred.  
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As an example, Figure 12 plots the annual funding required 
for the expendable architecture using the baseline launch 
configuration. The costs are broken down into DDTE, 
launch, production, and operations.  For the baseline, there 
is a significant amount of DDTE costs up-front, and then 
the annual costs decline once lunar missions begin. 
Production costs decrease each year as the learning curve 
decreases the cost of producing each element. All of the 
costs shown are in 2005 dollars. 
Depending on the choice of architecture and architecture 
elements, the cost distribution will be different than for the 
baseline case. For example, the baseline expendable 
architecture can be compared to the Existing EELV launch 
option #1a(D), as shown in Figure 13. Both of these launch 
options did well overall in terms of cost ($53B and $55B for 
the baseline and #1a(D), respectively). How their costs are 
spread out over the entire program, however, could have an 
impact on which is chosen depending on budget constraints. 
The baseline case has a higher DDTE (over $1B per year), 
but lower annual costs once lunar missions start. This 
results from the baseline launch vehicles having higher 
DDTE costs, but lower launch costs overall. Therefore, if 
more money were available up-front, the baseline case 
would make more sense financially, particularly if the 
program duration were increased. The lower annual costs 
will pay off even more as the number of missions flown 
increases. If the program duration were reduced, however, 
the baseline would become more expensive, since more 
money was invested up-front. If less money were available 
up-front for DDTE, then the Existing EELV option would 
have to be chosen. This would then result in higher costs 
down the road. 
The same charts can be created for the reusable architecture. 
Figure 14 shows the annual costs broken down by DDTE, 
depot resupply launches, lunar mission launches, production 
costs, and operations costs. For the reusable architecture, 
manufacturing takes place for two years before the first 
lunar mission, as opposed to one year for the expendable 
architecture. This is due to a longer manufacturing time for 
the reusable lander as well as the need to build three landers 
up front. The costs between the two architectures are 
actually fairly similar on a yearly basis, with the exception 
of the added cost of the propellant depot resupply launches. 
Although more TLIs need to be built per year, no landers 
are built on a yearly basis, which evens out the production 
costs. Therefore, the added cost in the reusable architecture 
can be accounted for in the cost of propellant launches to 
the lunar depot. 
The baseline improved launch option can also be compared 
to the Existing EELV launch option #1a(D) for the reusable 
architecture, as shown in Figure 15. The same trend is seen 
as for the expendable architecture. While the baseline 
improved launch configuration requires a higher up-front 
cost, its annual costs once the lunar missions begin are 
significantly lower. 
Finally, the peak annual funding required must be 
considered for each launch option for both architectures. 
While life-cycle cost and average cost per mission are 
important metrics, it is also important to consider the 
maximum annual cost in order to stay within a given 
budget. Obviously, lower is better. Figure 16 plots the peak 
annual cost for each launch option for both architectures. 
The reusable architecture, which has higher life-cycle costs, 
also has significantly higher peak annual costs. For the 
expendable and reusable architectures, the best launch 
options chosen based on the previous studies are the 
baseline and baseline improved, respectively. These also 
have the lowest peak annual cost. Therefore, the funding 
profile further confirms the selection of these launch 
configurations as the best choices for each architecture. 
Flight Rate Trade Study 
In general, when comparing a reusable architecture against 
an expendable architecture, it is expected that at some flight 
rate, there will be a crossover between which architecture is 
more affordable. In general, reusable architectures should 
require more infrastructure investment up-front, but as the 
number of missions flown increases, money should be 
saved since the variable costs per mission are much less. 
Expendable architectures, however, employ more of a “pay 
as you go” approach. There is less up-front investment, so 
you are basically paying for each mission as it is flown. 
Expendable architectures therefore tend to be favorable for 
low flight rates, while reusable architectures are favored for 
high-flight rates. 
This theory was thus tested for the reusable and expendable 
architecture modeled for this study, by varying the flight 
rate and plotting the costs at each flight rate. Figure 17 plots 
the cost per mission for each architecture, assuming 
unlimited ground infrastructure. The launch vehicles used 
are the best options resulting from the launch vehicle study. 
For the expendable architecture, the crew launch on a man-
rated EELV and the cargo launches on a 100mt heavy lift 
launch vehicle (baseline option).  For the reusable 
architecture, the crew also launch on a man-rated EELV and 
the cargo and propellant launch on a 140mt (baseline 
improved option). 
As can be seen, there is no flight rate where a crossover in 
cost will occur.  In fact, the two curves are diverging. The 
intended advantage of the reusable architecture is a 
reduction in the number of launches required per lunar 
mission, since a lander does not need to be launched for 
each mission. Additionally, fewer landers need to be 
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produced, since a single reusable lander is used for multiple 
missions. The reusable lander, however, requires the 
addition of a propellant depot in lunar orbit that must be 
periodically refilled. Because the lander requires 35 mt of 
propellant per lunar mission, on average this much 
propellant must be launched to lunar orbit for every manned 
mission. Additionally, a TLI stage must also be launched to 
ferry the propellant module out to lunar orbit. Therefore, 
anything gained by pre-deploying a reusable lander is 
counteracted by the addition of propellant launches to the 
depot and the production cost of more TLI stages. 
The two architectures can also be compared in terms of 
capture percentage for a given ground infrastructure as the 
flight rate is varied. Figure 18 plots the mission capture 
percentage as a function of number of missions per year. As 
can be seen, for the ground infrastructure available, the 
expendable architecture achieves a higher capture 
percentage across all flight rates, since it requires fewer 
launches and fewer TLI stages (even though it requires 
more landers, but this does not produce a significant 
bottleneck). 
For a given ground infrastructure, there is a maximum 
number of missions per year that can be achieved for each 
architecture. Therefore, as the desired number of missions 
per year increases, the actual number of missions flown will 
remain constant once the maximum is reached. This result is 
presented in Figure 19, which plots the actual number of 
missions achieved per year by each architecture. As 
expected from the above results, the expendable architecture 
is able to fly more missions. It plateaus around 2.4 missions 
per year, while the reusable architecture has a maximum of 
1.8 missions per year for the given ground infrastructure. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate two representative 
lunar exploration architectures in terms of cost, reliability, 
and mission throughput. The primary trade study was to 
examine various combinations of launch vehicles for each 
architecture, based on current leading candidates for the 
planned lunar missions. The best option for the expendable 
architecture, based on an overall evaluation criterion 
including cost, reliability, and scheduling, was to use a man-
rated version of an EELV for crew launches and a 100 mt 
heavy lift launch vehicle for cargo and propellant launches. 
The best option for the reusable architecture was to use the 
same man-rated EELV for crew and a 140 mt heavy lift 
launch vehicle for cargo and propellant. In general, the trade 
study showed that heavy-lift launch vehicles were favored, 
particularly for the cargo and propellant missions, since 
they required fewer launches per mission. The Shuttle-
derived vehicles also did fairly well in terms of cost (not so 
for reliability), but these costs were based on pre-CAIB 
estimates. Therefore, if the actual Space Shuttle launch 
costs were to increase, the Shuttle-derived vehicles would 
become significantly less attractive from a cost-standpoint. 
The Existing Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles also did 
very well in terms of cost, but because of the increased 
number of launches required, their loss of mission 
probability and scheduling metrics suffered. Unless the 
mass of the mission elements could be reduced, the only 
way to improve the scheduling metrics for the Existing 
EELVs would be to increase the number of launch pads 
available or to decrease the turn-around time of the pads. 
The loss of mission probability for the EELVs could be 
improved, however, by changing some of the mission 
assumptions. Instead of canceling a mission when a cargo 
launch fails, that element could simply be re-launched if an 
extra were kept available for such a situation. As a result, 
launch configurations requiring more cargo launches per 
lunar mission would not be penalized in terms of mission 
reliability simply because more launches are required. This 
change would make the Existing EELVs more competitive, 
albeit still worse than the HLVs for a given ground 
infrastructure due to their throughput capabilities. 
Therefore, it appears that investing in a heavy-lift launch 
vehicle would be beneficial. This of course assumes that the 
money is available up-front for the development of such a 
launch vehicle since their DDTE costs are much higher. If 
this were the case, it could save significant money down the 
road in terms of the lunar transportation costs. 
Regardless of the launch option chosen, however, the 
expendable architecture appears to be favorable. Although 
the loss of mission probability decreases slightly in some 
cases for the reusable architecture, the life-cycle cost and 
cost per mission increase significantly. The transportation-
related life-cycle and per mission costs range from $53B to 
$72B and from $2.9B to $3.9B for the expendable 
architecture. For the reusable architecture, they range from 
$86B to $137B and from $4.7B to $7.4B. As a point of 
comparison, Apollo cost $19.4B[6] over twelve years, 
which translated into 2005 dollars would cost 
approximately $68B. Apollo included seven attempted lunar 
landings (six of which were successful), while the baseline 
program for this study includes twenty attempted lunar 
landings over a 17-18 year program. Furthermore, the 
Apollo program cost not only includes the development, 
production, and operations costs associated with the 
transportation elements, but also includes costs associated 
with other program aspects that are not modeled in LASSO, 
such as science payloads and advanced technology 
development studies. Even the cheapest option for either 
launch architecture had a life-cycle cost of $53.3B for just 
the transportation elements. When the remaining programs 
are included, this cheapest option will begin to exceed the 
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Apollo program budget, albeit for more lunar missions. 
Even though more missions could be flown for around the 
same cost as the Apollo program, the budget is more 
restricted today than it was in the 1960’s and 1970’s. At its 
peak, Apollo spent $2.9B ($13.3B is 2005 dollars) in 1967, 
which comprised 70% of NASA’s total budget [6]. The 
latest NASA budget request (FY 2006) allocates $3.16B per 
year to the Exploration Systems directorate, which is 
responsible for the human lunar exploration. This is only 
19% of NASA’s total budget, and yearly increases through 
FY 2010 are only planned to account for inflation [7]. Even 
considering only the transportation-related costs modeled in 
LASSO, the cheapest architecture option does not fit within 
NASA’s current budget request. Reducing program costs, 
therefore, is of utmost importance in selecting a lunar 
transportation architecture. 
In addition to transportation-related costs, the expendable 
architecture also has the added advantage of requiring less 
infrastructure investment for a given flight rate and launch 
option. Manufacturing capacities are not an important 
factor, since for the capacities required (less than five in all 
cases examined), it is assumed that the production facilities 
would be expanded to meet the required demand. More 
launch pads and launch vehicle integration facilities would 
have to be built however. Currently, the Shuttle has two 
available launch pads at KSC, and the Atlas V and Delta IV 
Heavies each have one at Cape Canaveral [8]. Additionally, 
if the flight rate were to be increased beyond the baseline of 
two missions per year, the reusable would be the first of the 
two architectures to require increased launch infrastructure 
beyond what is currently available. 
The reliability of both architectures was also examined. In 
general, the loss of crew probability ranged anywhere from 
0.058 to 0.113 per mission. This probability represents the 
entire mission, so it encapsulates the reliability of the launch 
vehicles, in-space propulsive stages, the lunar lander, and 
the CEV reentry. Statistically, a 5% LOC will result in one 
loss of crew event every twenty missions, which is the 
baseline number of missions for this study. The LOM 
numbers, of course, are higher, and range from 0.128 to 
0.316. This implies that at best, approximately one in eight 
missions will be unsuccessful. As a comparison, Apollo had 
a loss of mission probability of 0.143 for the lunar landing 
missions, and even lower if the remaining Apollo missions 
are considered.  
From this study and the assumptions it contains, it appears 
that the reusable architecture should not be chosen over the 
expendable architecture, regardless of the launch 
configuration. This is not necessarily the case for general 
reusable vs. expendable architectures. It is still expected that 
a reusable architecture could be designed that would 
perform better in terms of cost for higher flight rates, even if 
it still requires more infrastructure investment up-front. 
Several improvements could be made to the current 
architecture that should make it more competitive. In 
particular, there could be more flexibility in the choice of 
launch vehicles for the depot resupply launches or in the 
packaging of all the elements for those missions. Although 
this study did not do an extensive launch vehicle 
optimization, this could improve the attractiveness of the 
reusable architecture. For the specific architectures studied, 
however, the expendable architecture is superior, although 
reusable architectures should not be definitively eliminated 
as a viable option for sustained human lunar exploration. 
Further study into other reusable architectures would be 
required to ascertain their overall effectiveness. 
Based on the LASSO results, several key conclusions can 
be drawn in regards to the architecture choices that must be 
made for human lunar exploration, as outlined below. It is 
important to remember that these conclusions are based on 
the architectures modeled and the mission and vehicle 
assumptions contained in this study. 
(1) An expendable architecture is favored over a reusable 
architecture, based on cost, reliability, and scheduling 
figures of merit. 
(2) Man-rated versions of Existing EELVs are most cost-
effective for crewed launches. 
(3) Expendable launch vehicles should be used for 
dedicated propellant launches (an RLV tanker was 
shown to not be cost effective). 
(4) Heavy-lift launch vehicles are preferred for cargo and 
propellant launches, because of the fewer launches 
required per lunar mission. 
These considerations are critical to establishing a cost-
effective and sustainable human lunar exploration program. 
If only performance metrics are used during the conceptual 
stage of the design process, a program can run into budget 
and schedule problems down the road, when they will be 
more difficult and expensive to correct. Therefore the 
capability to evaluate space exploration architectures based 
on cost, reliability, and scheduling figures of merit will be 
essential to successfully implementing the President’s 
Vision for Space Exploration through the next several 
decades. 
NOMENCLATURE 
CAIB – Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
CEV – Crew Exploration Vehicle 
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DDTE – Design, Development, Test, & Evaluation 
EELV – Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 
HLV – Heavy-Lift Launch Vehicle 
LASSO – Lunar Architecture Stochastic Simulator and 
Optimizer 
LOC – Loss of Crew 
LOM – Loss of Mission 
OEC – Overall Evaluation Criterion 
RLV – Reusable Launch Vehicle 
TEI – Trans-Earth Injection 
TLI – Trans-Lunar Injection 
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Figure 6 – Overall Evaluation Criterion (Cost, Reliability, and LEO Time) for Launch Vehicle Trade 























































































































Figure 13 – Annual Costs for Expendable Architecture 


























Figure 12 – Annual Costs for Expendable Architecture 



















































Figure 15 – Annual Costs for Reusable Architecture 



























Figure 14 – Annual Costs for Reusable Architecture using 
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Figure 19 – Actual Number of Missions per Year as a Function 
of Desired Annual Flight Rate 
